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The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the Indian Navy can 
respond to a growing Chinese fleet by analyzing the historical development of the 
Indian Navy since independence. Three naval expansion periods are identified, and 
three causal factors are measured to determine the effects of each factor on Indian 
naval expansion. The three factors are (1) responses to a perceived threat, (2) 
India's economic condition, and (3) the benefits of foreign military aid. The study 
shows that responses to an increase in perceived threat initially drove each 
expansion period, but a key factor in sustaining any period of development was the 
benefit of foreign military aid. The economy played a minor role in India's early 
history, but has become a primary factor for future fleet expansion. The conclusion 
of this thesis is that the Indian Navy will only expand if all three factors exist. 
Currently India perceives threats from China and Pakistan, and India is 
experiencing relative economic success. The factor that is not present - the one 
which will inhibit significant naval expansion - is the benefit of foreign military 
aid. Without a substitute arms supplier taking the placeof the Soviet Union, the 
Indian Navy isl not likely to expand in the near future. 
VI 
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China and India experienced the largest periods of naval expansion in the history of 
their navies during the middle to late 1980s. With the end of the Cold War and a 
decreased operational tempo of the superpower navies in the Indian Ocean region, China 
is emerging as the leading naval power in the arena. Will India's navy respond to a 
growing Chinese fleet by expanding its own navy? Can India respond to China's growing 
fleet? 
In this thesis, I analyze what the Indian Navy's force structure could resemble in 
the next twenty years, in response to India's perceived threats and India's history of naval 
development. In examaining the history of Indian naval development, I describe Indian 
grand strategy, Indian military strategy, and Indian naval missions. In discussing India's 
military strategy, it will be emphasized that the Navy is considered a low priority service in 
relation to the army and air force. 
I separate India's naval development into three phases: Expansion Period I - 1964- 
1969, Expansion Period II - 1975-1977, and Expansion Period III - 1985-1989. These 
periods are selected for three reasons. After analyzing Jane's Fighting Ships from 1947 to 
1994, these are periods in which the number of ships in India's inventory had a dramatic 
increase in force size, number of ships, or significant increase in capability. For example, 
a significant increase in force size would be the acquisition of conventional submarines 
doubling the previous compliment, or acquiring an aircraft carrier or nuclear submarine. 
Also these periods of naval expansion correspond directly to several leading analyses of 
Indian naval development. Finally, these periods correspond to specific increases in India's 
defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP. 
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After establishing these three periods of naval expansion, I correlate the direct 
effects of three factors on Indian naval development during each of these developmental 
periods. Specifically, I test three hypotheses: 
1. Hypothesis number one. The Threat Hypothesis - If there is an increase in 
perceived threat, then there is an increase in naval force structure. This is based on the 
security dilemma and more specifically Stephen Walt's "balance of threat" theory as 
described in The Origins of Alliances. 
2. Hypothesis number two: The Economic Hypothesis - If there is an increase in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), then there will be an increase in naval force structure. 
This hypothesis is based on economists Michael D. Ward and A. K. Mahajan's "Defense 
Expenditures, Security Threats, and Government Deficits: A Case Study of India, 1952- 
1979," and International Monetary Fund economist Daniel Hewitt's "Military 
Expenditures Worldwide: Determinants and Trends, 1972-1988." The previously 
mentioned economists postulate that as a country's GDP increases, the military spending 
as a percentage of GDP also increases. This thesis will examine that theory in reverse by 
checking for a correlation between the GDP and the military expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP since 1947. 
3. Hypothesis number three: The Foreign Military Aid Hypothesis - If India 
receives a high amount of foreign military aid, then there is an increase in naval force 
structure. This is also based on Walt's balance of threat theory in that the advantages 
gained in terms of foreign aid, specifically military aid, will allow a country to spend more 
on defense. 
The dependent variable is naval acquisitions (or changes in force structure) and 
defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The three independent variables are: 1) 
perceived threats, 2) economic performance, and 3) level of foreign military aid as a result 
of an alliance with Soviet Union. 
The data indicates that India's reaction to perceived threat was the initial factor in 
all three naval expansion periods, combined with the foreign military aid package provided 
by the Soviet Union. Although economic factors were not influential in the first two 
expansion periods, economic factors were important in the third expansion period, which 
was the largest of the three periods in terms of defense expenditures and acquisitions. 
Therefore, it is concluded that a combination of response to perceived threat, some form 
of significant foreign military aid and a stable economy is necessary for India to experience 
a fourth naval expansion period similar to the magnitude of the first three periods. 
India responded to increases in threat according to Walt's balance of threat theory. 
Throughout India's history, a perceived threat from Pakistan or China existed prior to a 
naval expansion period. The threat was either in the form of direct conflicts or wars, or 
perceived capabilities and unclear intentions. By reviewing India's confrontational history 
with Pakistan and China, adequate threat was consistently present to warrant an Indian 
military build-up. As the threat increased significantly, the Indian Navy expanded 
significantly in accordance with Walt's balance of threat theory. 
Hewitt's and Ward's economic theory that countries will expand their military 
capabilities as their economies grow was valid during one of the three Indian naval 
expansion periods. Although the first two periods did not correlate to an economically 
successful period for the Indian economy, it is important to note that India still managed 
to increase its defense budget. Since the third expansion period was the largest period in 
terms of defense expenditures and acquisitions, it appears that economic factors are 
becoming more important as military weapons and ship platforms become more expensive. 
Economic factors will play an important role in a fourth Indian naval expansion period. 
Walt's foreign military aid theory is particularly enlightening in India's case. The 
favorable terms between the Soviets and the Indians were the most important factor in 
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allowing India to expand its Navy. In compliance with the foreign military aid theory, the 
Soviets looked to increase their leverage over India to counter U.S. leverage over 
Pakistan. By the favorable terms with India, the Soviet Union felt India would be a 
potential ally in South Asia. The Indians were smart to take advantage of the Soviet 
military link and consequently built a strong naval component, consisting primarily of 
Soviet-bought platforms and technology. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
significantly affected the capabilities of the Indian Navy which is now finding it difficult to 
locate spare parts and equipment to maintain its primarily Soviet-bought fleet. 
Nevertheless, the military aid package that the Soviets provided was perhaps the most 
important factor that helped drive Indian naval expansion. 
India's economic success has become very important. Perceived threat is almost 
taken for granted due to a combination of India's aspirations to be the dominant regional 
power and a tradition of rivalry between India and Pakistan, and between India and China. 
The key factor will be India's ability to transform their economic success into purchasing 
power by seeking favorable military options from new markets in Europe and in the CIS. 
All three hypotheses will contribute to India expanding its navy for a fourth time. First of 
all, by understanding that China and Pakistan are still threats, Indian naval planners will 
lobby for an increase in naval force structure. Secondly, with continued economic 
success, India can pay for the latest ship types and modern weaponry with hard currency. 
Finally, by actively seeking favorable contract terms with other countries, India can 
purchase these new ship platforms at a reasonable price to the Indian government and the 
supplying countries. 
This thesis concludes that India will not soon experience a fourth naval expansion 
due to the lack of foreign military aid. The only factor of the three tested in this thesis that 
is not present today is the foreign military aid package. As a result, the Indian Navy is in 
troubled waters, and will continue to struggle into the turn of the century. The basis 
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for this argument is the fact that the strongest factor in the history of Indian naval 
development was the favorable terms contracts that the Soviets shared with India. 
Without those terms, the Indian Navy would not have experienced the significant increases 
in naval force structure. An example of the effect of the Soviet military link is that 
currently seventy per cent of the Indian Navy consists of Soviet-built equipment. The 
Soviet military link began in the early 1960s just prior to the first naval expansion period 
and continued strong until the end of the third naval expansion period. When combined 
with perceived threat and economic success, the Soviet military link enabled India to 
purchase major ship platforms and technology pushing them into the category of a strong 
middle sized fleet. 
Without some form of military aid or favorable terms, the Indian Navy will not 
expand. If the Indian Navy is to increase in force size and force structure in the next 
twenty years, India must alter its foreign policy and establish better relations with the 
United States and China in order to capitalize on the best military technology that these 
two countries can offer. However, it is very likely that both countries will require India to 
make certain concessions resembling a stronger alliance and interdependence than perhaps 
India is willing to make. It seems that currently India does not have an answer to the 
problem of their military arms supplier dilemma. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the fastest growing economy in the world, 
China is rapidly acquiring the economic means to 
build and support a first-rate navy.*- 
China and India experienced the largest periods of 
naval expansion in the history of their navies during the 
middle to late 1980s. With the end of the Cold War and a 
decreased operational tempo of the superpower navies in the 
Indian Ocean region, will India's navy respond to a growing 
Chinese fleet, by expanding its navy? Can India respond to 
China's growing fleet? 
In this thesis, I analyze what the Indian Navy's force 
structure could resemble in the next twenty years, in 
response to India's perceived threats and India's history of 
naval development. India's naval development will be 
divided into three separate expansion periods based on 
significant increases in defense expenditures as a 
proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and significant 
increases in ship types both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. Expansion Period I - 1964-1969, Expansion 
Period II - 1975-1977, and Period III - 1985-1989 all 
correspond to phases in India's history when defense 
expenditures and ship acquisitions significantly increased. 
I argue that India's naval development was primarily threat- 
driven in response to wars with Pakistan and China and the 
prospect of external power intervention, particularly as 
prompted by the presence of the USS Enterprise in the Bay of 
Bengal. I show that in addition to perceived threats, an 
overriding factor in Indian naval development was India's 
ability to procure equipment from the Soviet Union and some 
western countries through India's policy of non-alignment. 
I examine the effects of India's economy and India's 
foreign policy in relation to the Soviet Union as they 
affect naval development. Through examining India's economy 
and non-alignment policy, this thesis explains how the 
economy had no real affect on Indian naval development. I 
also correlate the benefits of India's foreign policy during 
the Cold War with all of the three phases of India's naval 
development. 
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I 
contains a brief introduction with an explanation of the 
relevance of understanding Indian naval development and 
American foreign policy. The last portion of chapter I 
explains the methodology used to conduct the research. 
Chapter II briefly explains Indian strategic thinking 
and how it affects Indian naval development and other 
branches of the Indian armed forces.  Chapter III tests each 
hypotheses by comparing the data from different sources. 
After establishing the three different naval expansion 
periods, each hypothesis will be tested to see if there is 
any correlation between the hypothesis and the expansion 
period. 
Chapter IV summarizes the findings of the data in 
chapter III to determine exactly which hypothesis had a 
stronger impact on naval development. Chapter V applies the 
findings in chapter IV to the condition of the hypotheses in 
the 1990s. The condition of the hypotheses in the 1990s 
applied to the history of what has driven Indian naval 
development will imply whether the Indian Navy will expand 
in the next twenty years. 
Chapter VI is a conclusion, where I contend that there 
will not be a fourth naval expansion based on the results 
from this research. In other words, not all the factors 
that successfully drove Indian naval expansion in the past 
are present in the 1990s, and will not likely change in the 
next twenty years. 
A.  RELEVANCE OF INDIAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 
Before examining India's history of naval development, 
it is important to understand the relevance of a Chinese- 
Indian naval arms race and the implications for U.S. foreign 
policy with respect to both countries. 
As stated in 1995 by the Clinton Administration in its 
National  Security Strategy of Engagement  and Enlargement: 
The United States has engaged India and Pakistan 
in seeking agreement on steps to cap, reduce, and 
ultimately  eliminate  their  weapons  of  mass 
destruction and ballistic missile capabilities. 
Regional stability and improved bilateral ties are 
also important for America's economic interest in 
a region that contains a quarter of the world's 
population and one of its most important emerging 
markets. 
Understanding the history of Indian naval development 
is important to the United States because it directly 
affects U.S. foreign policy in the region. The value of a 
stronger Indian Navy could be important as the United States 
looks to Asian countries to assume greater responsibilities 
within their regions. The first concern will be the 
security and stability of the region, particularly the 
Indian Ocean. Currently the United States regularly patrols 
the Indian Ocean as part of its deterrence mission. The 
increase in both size and activity of the Indian Navy could 
propose new problems for the U.S. Navy. 
Another concern is India's proximity to the Persian 
Gulf. If another Persian Gulf War occurs an expanding 
Indian Navy could assist the United States in patrolling of 
the Gulf waters, as did the French, Canadian and Australian 
Navies. Another major concern for the United States would 
be the possibility of an arms race between India and China. 
Currently with normalization talks existing between the 
United States and China, any military assistance the United 
States might provide to India could upset both U.S.-China 
relations as well as U.S.-India relations.  "The location of 
India sitting astride important sea lanes and focal points, 
gives her a strategically advantageous position."3 
Economically, the Indian Ocean is characterized by 
several important features. About 65 per cent of the world's 
proven oil resources lie in the Gulf region. The oil-rich 
region and the sea lanes which criss cross the Arabian Sea 
and the Indian Ocean are very important to the developed and 
developing countries alike. The Indian Ocean is one of the 
major trade routes of the world. The ocean bed has vast 
amounts of valuable minerals, which attract the attention 
not only of the United States, but also of other Western 
developed countries. Of vital interest to the western world 
and Japan are minerals such as gold, chromium, coal, iron 
ore, bauxite, copper, uranium, antimony and diamonds. Of 
equal economic importance is the existence of huge consumer 
markets in the region.4 
In order to safeguard these vital sea lanes, India 
relies heavily on a coastal defense navy. India's naval 
missions range from protecting the coastline to ensuring 
safe passage through the Indian Ocean. As with most coastal 
navies, the Indian Navy is responsible for protecting its 
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). In order to complete all of 
its missions, the Indian Navy has evolved through certain 
naval development stages which are explained in Ashley 
Tellis' "Securing the Barrack."5 
With vital interests in the Persian Gulf, it would be 
beneficial for the United States to continue to develop its 
foreign policy with regard to India and perhaps a more 
developed Indian Navy. With a history of regional 
conflicts between Indian and Pakistan, and later India and 
China, combined with the growing aspirations for a blue 
water fleet by the Chinese, American policy makers should be 
concerned with the possibility of a Chinese-Indian naval 
arms race. 
B.  METHODOLOGY 
In analyzing the history of Indian naval development, I 
begin by explaining Indian grand strategy, Indian military 
strategy, and Indian naval missions. In discussing India's 
military strategy, it will be emphasized that the Navy is 
considered a low priority service in relation to the army 
and air force. 
I then separate India's naval development into three 
distinct phases: Expansion Period I - 1964-1969, Expansion 
Period II - 1975-1977, and Expansion Period III - 1985-1989. 
The reasoning for selecting these periods is based on three 
factors. After analyzing Jane's Fighting Ships from 1947 to 
1994, these are periods in which the number of ships in 
India's inventory had a dramatic increase in force size, 
number of ships, or significant increase in capability. For 
example, a significant increase in force size would be the 
acquisition of conventional submarines doubling the previous 
compliment, or acquiring an aircraft carrier or nuclear 
submarine. Also these periods of naval expansion correspond 
directly to Tellis' analysis of Indian naval development as 
well as to Amit Gupta's explanation of India's military 
force structure and military doctrine.6 And finally, these 
periods correspond to specific increases in India's defense 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP. 
After establishing these three periods of naval 
expansion, I attempt to correlate the direct effects of 
three factors on Indian naval development during each of 
these developmental periods.  I test three hypotheses: 
1. Hypothesis number one: The Threat Hypothesis - If 
there is an increase in perceived threat, then there is an 
increase in naval force structure. This is based on the 
security dilemma and more specifically Stephen M. Walt's 
balance of threat theory as described in The Origins of 
Alliances. 
2. Hypothesis number two: The Economic Hypothesis - If 
there is an increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) . then 
there is an increase in naval force structure. This 
hypothesis is based on economists Michael D. Ward and A. K. 
Mahajan's "Defense Expenditures, Security Threats, and 
Government Deficits:   A Case Study of India, 1952-1979," 
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and International Monetary Fund economist Daniel Hewitt's 
"Military Expenditures Worldwide: Determinants and Trends, 
1972-1988."° The previously mentioned economists postulate 
that as a country's GDP increases, the military spending as 
a percentage of GDP also increases. This thesis will 
examine that theory in reverse by checking for a correlation 
between the GDP and the military expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP since 1947.9 
3. Hypothesis number three: The Foreign Military Aid 
Hypothesis - If India receives a high amount of foreign 
military aid, then there is an increase in naval force 
structure. This is also based on Walt's balance of threat 
theory in that the advantages gained in terms of foreign 
aid, specifically military aid, will allow a country to 
spend more on defense.10 
The dependent variable is naval acquisitions or changes 
in force structure, and defense expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP. The three independent variables will therefore be: 
1) Perceived threats, 2) Economic performance, and 3) Level 
of foreign military aid as a result of an alliance with 
Soviet Union. 
1. The  Threat Hypothesis: 
Description: This hypothesis is be based on India's 
confrontational history with Pakistan and China. Using 
past wars or conflicts as indicators, I determine if India's 
naval expansion was threat-driven or had other origins. 
This is accomplished by correlating the year of actual 
conflicts with a corresponding period of actual expansion. 
Also contributing to this hypothesis is official statements 
from the Indian Navy that describes naval expansion 
occurring as a result of recent wars with either Pakistan or 
China. 
Since India never had a formal alignment with the 
Soviet Union, it would be improper to address India's 
actions as aligning with the Communist Bloc countries. 
India did have a formal agreement with the Soviet Union 
known as the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation 
which called for join consultatioons in the event of 
substantial military threat to either party. In that 
regard, India did have a formal alliance with the Soviet 
Union. Walt's theory is also applicable in the sense of his 
description of states' behavior in chapter eight of his book 
when he states, "I identified several popular hypotheses 
that are often used to explain how states choose their 
friends. "H 
Based on Walt's balance of threat theory, the balance 
of power school did not sufficiently explain the behavior of 
states that were not directly affected by the two 
superpowers either by geography or historical alliances. In 
fact, there never was a "balance" during the alliances, 
because in both World Wars, the alliances were 
disproportional. The balance of power theory does not 
explain the unpopularity of the Warsaw Pact, and does not 
explain the preferences and actions of lesser states. India 
and Pakistan fit into this description because as Walt 
states, countries respond to the balance of threat situation 
based solely on the threat posed by its immediate neighbors. 
The lesser states do not affect the balance between 
superpowers as much as they affect the balance of regional 
powers and the ability to counter any one particularly 
dominant regional power. The actions of the superpowers 
will not alter or shape the actions of the third world 
because the balance of threat is not disturbed. Walt states 
that the difference between balance of power and balance of 
threat is that the balance of threat theory incorporates the 
other factors that create threats to national sovereignty, 
which is very important to all peripheral countries.12 
As Walt explains, in the balance of threat scenario, 
states act in order to protect themselves determined by the 
threats they perceive - power of others is merely an 
important element in their calculations; therefore power of 
others can be a liability or an asset depending on 
capability, location and employment.  One central issue is 
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how states respond to threats. As Walt explains, "states 
ally to balance against threats rather than power alone; 
level of threat affected by geographic proximity, offensive 
capabilities, and perceived intentions."-1-3 
Also contributing to the threat argument is Ward and 
Mahajan's study which concludes that based on India's 
economic history and military expenditures, a country will 
spend more based on perceived threats from its neighbors. 
India is no exception, and as Ward and Mahajan suggest, is a 
perfect example.'* 
2. The Economic Hypothesis: 
Description: The threat hypothesis examines the effect 
of economic development on the naval expansion periods. To 
test this hypothesis, I will compare GDP growth percentages 
to the expansion periods to determine if the GDP increased 
or decreased. Basically, if GDP increased during the same 
years as naval expansion occurred, it could be argued that 
the economic situation had a direct effect on naval 
expansion. In conjunction with that argument, if GDP 
decreased during the periods that there was no naval 
expansion, then the economic situation also affected naval 
expansion in a negative way. Or, as I argue, it could be 
that the economic situation had no real effect on naval 
expansion.    In other words,  there were  increases  and 
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decreases during the same expansion periods that had no 
relevance on defense expenditures. 
Hewitt's examination of military expenditures and 
trends concluded that "military expenditures are found to 
rise with GDP. For low-income countries, as GDP rises 
military expenditures rise somewhat more quickly." Hewitt 
also concluded that a prosperous economy is beneficial for 
the military in that the military expenditures is directly 
related to economic growth.15 It is important to note that 
in general, the theory is correct. For example, the 
countries known as the East Asian Newly Indisutrialized 
Countries (NIC's) comprised of Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand, all have acted in conjunction with this 
theory. Each one of the aforementioned countries has 
increased military spending and began to construct 
formidable militaries as a result of unprecedented economic 
growth. As a result, other Asian countries such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia are predicted to increase military 
forces in conjunction with their predicted economic growth. 
This thesis examines India in reverse order as opposed 
to the theory of Ward and Hewitt. By examining the history 
of naval development, I show that during the first two naval 
expansion periods, India's economic growth was irrelevant to 
its military growth. In other words, India has been able to 
increase its military spending regardless of GDP growth 
12 
because the percentage of military expenditures has been 
relatively small since independence. 
3. The Foreign Military Aid Hypothesis: 
Description: Hypothesis number three will be based on 
India's ability to acquire weapons and platforms, especially 
submarines, by successfully manipulating its foreign policy 
while maintaining what Indian leaders called their "non- 
alignment" policy. This hypothesis is closely related to 
another of Walt's hypotheses that states that there will be 
certain alliances or relations formed simply due to the 
avialability of military weapons or other forms of military 
aid. As Walt states, the provision of military assistance 
can create an effective alliance, because it communicates 
favorable intentions, because it envokes a sense of 
gratitude, or because the recipient becomes dependent on the 
donor.16 Therefore, the hypothesis in India's case is that 
the stronger relations that India projects to support with 
the Soviet Union will result in more military aid that India 
will receive from the Soviets. In contrast, the Soviets 
established this relationship in order to keep influence in 
the region, countering the influence the United States had 
over Pakistan. The problem that may result in both cases of 
India and Pakistan is the ability of the superpowers to 
monopolize the supply of the important asset,  which in 
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effect would create an over-dependence on military hardware 
from one supplier. 
The foreign military aid hypothesis is of particular 
importance in India's phase III of naval development; a time 
when there is no actual threat to India's national security. 
This hypothesis will also address the fact that mere 
availability of weapons and ships from the former Soviet 
Union had a greater affect on naval expansion than any other 
factor. 
Walt summarizes the hypothesis on foreign aid as: 1) 
more aid implies more likely to form an alliance, 2) the 
greater the external threat faced by the recipient, in this 
case Pakistan and China, then the greater the effect of aid 
on alignment, 3) the greater the donor's monopoly of the 
commodity, the greater the leverage over the recipient, 4) 
the greater the dependence favoring the donor, then the 
greater the leverage over the recipient, and 5) the greater 
asymetry of the donor, then the greater the leverage over 
the recipient.17 
An important factor to consider with hypothesis number 
three is Walt's caveat that the weaker the domestic 
political decision-making apparatus of the recipient, the 
less leverage the donor can exert on the recipient. India's 
domestic decision-making process made it difficult for the 
Soviets to formally align with the Indians because the 
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Soviets could not gain effective leverage by only supplying 
military hardware. 
After comparing the effects of each hypotheses, a 
conclusion is formed as to the likelihood of a fourth Indian 
naval expansion period. The conclusion is based on how each 
factor affected Indian naval development in the past, and 
the condition of those same factors in the 1990s. 
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II. INDIAN STRATEGIC THINKING 
The experience of the British raj provided India 
with a geopolitical frame of reference that 
continues to influence present-day Indian 
strategy. As the British built and nurtured their 
empire in India, they also evolved a strategy for 
India's defense. On land and sea, the British 
sought to deny other powers easy access to the 
subcontinent. They set buffer states to secure 
the land periphery and help defend the core; sea 
control ensured that all other powers were denied 
the means  to penetrate  Indian waters  or  to 
challenge any strategic sea routes.18 
This chapter discusses India's strategic thinking and 
the belief of Indian policy makers that India should be the 
dominant force in South Asia. It is India's grand strategy 
that forces India to maintain a certain level of military 
dominance over its neighbors, especially Pakistan. 
A.  INDIAN GRAND STRATEGY 
The Indian security strategy is described as a series 
of concentric circles or rings called a mandala. The first 
circle is India itself. The second circle encompasses 
India's smallest contiguous neighbors: Sri Lanka, Nepal, 
Bangladesh, and the Maldives. The third circle includes 
Pakistan, China, and the Soviet Union. And the final circle 
includes the more distant great powers and the rest of the 
world. ^ 
The mandala concept of a grand strategy existed prior 
to India's independence, and has been carried through by 
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India's following Prime Ministers.   India's most pressing 
strategic concern is its own internal unity.   India's 
history is marked by brief periods of unity and splendor 
with much longer periods of conflict and disunity.  Most of 
the  problems  arise  from  different  ethnic,  linguistic, 
regional and communal factors, one or more of which have 
negatively affected India after each brief period of unity. 
A majority of the internal unity is highlighted by the 
diversities in the border zones of outer India, including 
Kashmir.     Although  Kashmir  will  not  be  discussed 
specifically in this paper, it suffices to say that the 
conflicts as a result of the Kashmir dispute have driven an 
ethnic wedge between many groups in the interior portions of 
India as well as in the border territories in the north, 
northeast and northwest. 
The second circle of the mandala consists of India's 
small neighbors which comprise small points of 
vulnerability. Although none of these countries poses a 
serious threat to India, excluding of course, Pakistan, 
India sees these neighbors as threatening in other ways. 
Examples are Sri Lanka's problems with the Tamils, ethnic 
and immigration problems with the Bengalis in Bangladesh, 
and also tribal problems in northeast India often involving 
Burma. All of the previous problems listed are dangerous to 
India for several reasons that are not very obvious to 
countries outside of the South Asian region.  For instance, 
some of the problems in these outer areas involve ethnic and 
communal problems similar to those of India, and some 
Indians fear the chance of spillover into India which would 
present certain internal security problems within India. 
Another problem is that some of these countries have 
solicited support and aid from powers outside the region so 
as to balance India's preponderance of power. 
Therefore, in response to these possible threats, India 
has established itself as a regional hegemon by ensuring 
that India will not allow a bordering state to involve 
itself in any foreign affairs action or defense policy issue 
that India considers potentially dangerous or threatening to 
Indian security. In addition, India will not allow foreign 
governments to establish a presence, military or otherwise 
or exert any form of influence in a neighboring state that 
India views as unfriendly.^° 
The third circle involved Pakistan, China and the 
former Soviet Union. Pakistan is India's primary threat due 
to the Kashmir dispute, religious differences, geographic 
proximity and three past wars. Similarly, China is listed 
as a threat to India because of its proximity and due to the 
Sino-Indian Conflict in October of 1962. On the other hand, 
the former Soviet Union was originally viewed as a threat 
because of its ability to influence China and the rest of 
India's neighbors simply because of its super power status 
and capabilities. 
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The fourth circle consists primarily of western 
powers. This defense against invading super powers 
originated from India's overall perception of defending 
against colonialism as experienced during British rule. It 
is because of India's past that Jawarhal Nehru initially 
sought for a foreign policy of non-alignment. Therefore, 
the defense for the fourth concentric ring is primarily an 
ideological and political defense rather than a military 
defense. 
B.  INDIA'S MILITARY STRATEGY 
India's military strategy is primarily threat-based 
deriving from past conflicts with Pakistan and China that 
both took place by land. It is due to these conflicts that 
India has concentrated the majority of its national defense 
to prevent any vulnerability from future land attacks either 
from their neighbors or other powers such as the former 
Soviet Union did against Afghanistan. 
Immediately after partition, India prioritized its 
armed forces in the order of Army, Air Force and then the 
Navy. It was envisioned by Indian military planners that 
the Army must stop the invasion of India's neighbors, and 
that the Air Force would supplement the Army's defense with 
tactical air support. The Navy would attempt to deny sea 
lanes and minimally support the overall military strategy by 
performing functions such as blockades.   The first clear 
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expansion of the armed forces occurred in 1964 when India 
embarked on a five-year plan to build up its defense. 
India's first priority was the creation of a 825,000-man 
Army and the modernization of its weapons and equipment. 
The second step was the stabilization of the Air Force at 
forty-five squadrons, its re-equipment with modern aircraft, 
and the provision of suitable ancillary facilities. Because 
the Navy was considered the least important of the three 
forces, it simply maintain itself at the present strength, 
replacing obsolete vessels with new foreign ships. 
However, it was at this time that the Navy began to 
modernize itself by replacing its ships with better, more 
equipped ships from foreign navies. India's overall 
military strategy was reflected by a press release stating 
that ...the Army is would to constitute the primary and most 
significant force in terms of size and budget. The Army 
would remain the bastion of defense until 1970 or 1975, by 
which time it is predicted that the Air Force will have 
developed its own production base. ■*■ 
C.  INDIA'S NAVAL MISSIONS 
As reflected in India's overall military strategy, and 
as  described  by  Tellis,  the  Indian  Navy  has  always 
maintained a strictly defensive role, which it inherited 
from the British as a result of partition.  At partition, 
the Royal Indian Navy was divided between India and Pakistan 
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in the rough proportion of two to one. Although Indian 
naval tradition dates back to 2500-1500 B.C., its official 
beginnings as a maritime power in the region started after 
partition. Initial naval requirements were simple at 
first, however, India reportedly desired a "preponderance of 
naval power" vis-a-vis her Asiatic neighbors to guarantee 
that, although India strongly and truly denie any aggressive 
policy or intentions, where India was concerned, she would 
have a reasonable assurance of freedom of the seas through 
the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal for her own 
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maritime interests'^ 
In order to achieve this "preponderance of naval 
power," the Nehru administration sought to secure and 
maintain naval superiority over neighboring nations. The 
end result was that India believed it needed "...a navy 
possessing the nucleus of a striking force, as well as 
escort vessels and local flotillas to safeguard base 
areas."^ 
India then began to construct a Navy capable of meeting 
limited missions of coastal defense, and later, in the 
1980's announced its aspirations to build a blue water 
navy complete with aircraft carriers. What has evolved over 
the past fifty years is a Navy that is comparable to the 
definition proposed by Commodore P. J. Cowling of the Royal 
British Navy, when he describes his own British fleet: 
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The Royal Navy looks upon itself as a medium sized 
maritime force...At the lower end of the "medium" 
spectrum is a nation which can deploy and support 
a squadron of frigate sized vessels and has some 
conventional submarines: such a nation can run a 
limited sea denial control campaign, 
but can only be really effective within the 
framework of an alliance. At the top end is a 
navy which has the potential, if required, to act 
independently at sea and is capable to project its 
sea power to affect matters on land. 4 
The Indian Navy is somewhere between the low end and the 
high end of the medium sized Navy spectrum. And with its 
current force structure, India has its basic naval missions 
that support the nation's overall military strategy: 
1) Coastal defense 
2) Protection of sea lines of communication 
3) Deterrence 
4) Sea control 
5) Naval presence 
6) Power projection 
7) Monitoring big power navies^ 
India's grand strategy has ensured that the Indian Navy 
will always have a strong role in protecting India's 
national interests. As a smaller portion of the Indian 
armed forces, the Indian Navy provides the necessary 
elements to give the Indian armed forces a total military 
package. A historical problem for India is transforming a 
good grand strategy into specific military capabilities in 
support of its grand strategy.   India has clear national 
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interests that originate from protecting its EEZ and the 
Indian Ocean region. Indian policy makers are too vague 
when attempting to make its military capabilities meet its 
national security objectives. The remainder of this thesis 
describes the role of the Indian Navy in attempting to 
support Indian national security objectives. 
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III. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
This chapter tests each of the three competing 
hypotheses by examining whether the data supports the 
assumption of the hypotheses. The first portion establishes 
the criteria for dividing India's naval development into 
three expansion periods. The second portion presents each 
hypothesis and measures them against the expansion periods 
for correlation. If a particular hypothesis can explain why 
the Indian Navy expanded, then it will be concluded that the 
hypothesis is a strong indicator of what drives Indian naval 
development. 
A.  ESTABLISHING THREE NAVAL EXPANSION PERIODS 
From the establishment of the Indian Navy at partition 
to what is now a medium sized fleet, the evolution of 
India's naval development successfully progressed from a 
Navy with simple maritime interests to that of a Navy 
considered by many to be the regional sea power in South 
Asia. Using Tellis' three models of naval development, I 
will establish that there were three distinct beginnings of 
naval expansion periods as mentioned in the introduction of 
this paper: 1964, 1975 and 1985. Initially these periods 
will directly correspond to India's reaction to perceived 
threats and the immediate naval expansion as a result of 
those threats.  Tellis' models are as follows: 
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Model I - coastal defense; Model II - fleets specializing in 
two or three discrete operational tasks such as coalition 
participants, regional control, and ability to exert extra- 
regional penetration; and Model III - a fleet fully blue- 
water capable. 
India's Navy experienced minor periods of expansion 
prior to 1964. Model I of Tellis is defined as "...low 
capability fleets possessing only local coastal defense 
capabilities."26 It was in the 1950s and early 1960s when 
India began acquiring British vessels to help in their 
coastal defense mission, replacing the earlier mission of 
constabulary roles. The limitations on India's Navy were 
due to the Navy's relative unimportance in relation to the 
other military forces in India, and because of these 
limitations, a coastal defense policy was all that could be 
supported. 
The Indian Navy remains the smallest of the three armed 
forces. The Navy: Air Force: Army personnel ratio for India 
is in the order of 1:2:22, and the naval portion of the 
Indian defense budget has only recently crossed the 10 per 
cent mark, slowly increasing back to a respectable level of 
12 per cent in 1984-85.27 
Initially, the development of India's post-independence 
naval forces were the result of concerns by British naval 
planners whose primary concern was protecting the export 
routes of the colonial textile industry.  As Lome J. Kavic, 
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author of India's Quest for Security, states the Admiralty 
aspired to attain a Navy comprised of a force of escort 
vessels and local flotillas of minesweepers, and the 
extension of base repair facilities that could support 
India's forces in support of an internal, defensive naval 
force. As early as 1947, Vice Admiral W. E. Parry of the 
Indian Naval Headquarters proposed the Indianization of the 
Navy consisting of two light fleet aircraft carriers, three 
light cruisers, eight to nine destroyers, and the necessary 
support vessels.28 This Indianization was proposed with the 
direct mission of Phase I, coastal defense. 
It is important to emphasize that the value of the 
aircraft carrier battle group was proven consistently in the 
Second World War by both U.S. allied forces and Japan. It 
was this success that began the trend among world naval 
powers to achieve a mobile, air strike capability. 
Therefore, India's quest for a multiple air strike force, 
although not completely consistent with a coastal defense 
policy, was in conjunction with contemporary naval world 
powers, and was a direct result of perceived threats. 
1.  Expansion Period I - 1964-1969: 
Description. This first expansion period can be 
described in two methods: 1) number of ships or size of the 
fleet, and 2) defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
Ideally, the increase in defense expenditure as a per cent 
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of GDP will precede an increase in ship acquisition by one 
to two years. Although different sources are not identical 
in terms of their numerical data, both the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which 
publishes the SIPRI Yearbook on World Armaments and 
Disarmaments, and the Arms Control Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA), which publishes the World Military Expenditure and 
Arms Transfer, show increases in defense expenditure for the 
period of 1963-1966. Prior to 1960, defense expenditure was 
1.8 to 1.9 per cent of GDP. SIPRI reports that in 1963 
defense expenditure rose dramatically to 3.8 per cent and 
continued at 3.5 per cent in 1966, before dropping to 3.0 
per cent in 1969. Similarly, the ACDA figures report that 
there was a sharp increase in defense expenditures in 1963- 
64 of 4.4 per cent as compared to 2.99 per cent in 1962-63. 
ACDA also shows the defense expenditure percentage remaining 
at 4.02 per cent in 1965-66 before dropping to 3.5 per cent 
in 1966-67.29 
Jane's Fighting Ships also reflects this naval 
expansion period in terms of number and types of ships. The 
naval build up from 1947-1962 helped to accumulate a force 
structure consisting of one medium sized aircraft carrier, 
two cruisers, three destroyers, thirteen frigates, and 32 
miscellaneous smaller craft, which remained constant 
throughout this period. Not until 1964, 1965 and 1966 did 
the Indian Navy truly expand by adding submarines to its 
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fleet,  and  increasing  its  compliment  of  frigates  to 
seventeen. 0 
2.  Expansion Period II - 1975-77: 
The second expansion period can also be described by 
defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP, and increases 
in naval force structure. SIPRI reports increases of 
defense expenditures in 1972, 1975, and 1976 of 3.5, 3.3 and 
3.2 per cents respectively. Prior to this period, SIPRI 
data indicates that defense expenditures were averaging 
around 2.8-3.0 percent. ACDA figures are even more 
remarkable at 3.89 per cent for both 1971-72, and 1972-73 
periods, and 3.72 per cent for 1975-76. ACDA also reports 
that defense expenditures remained relatively high through 
the late 1970's, ranging from 3.39 per cent in 1974-75 to 
3.78 per cent in 1979-1980.31 
The increase in naval force structure in the period 
from 1974-79 began with the acquisition of four more 
submarines which mathematically signified a 100 per cent 
increase in India's submarine force in one year, 1975. 
Throughout this period of naval expansion, India completed 
its force build up to total 29 frigates, eight corvettes, 
and 70 miscellaneous craft by the years of 1979 and 1980. 
Prior to 1974, the Indian Navy consisted of only 63 total 
ships, including the four submarines purchased in 1965. 
This increase in force structure was not only in pure 
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numerical terms, but also in capability, as India was viewed 
as obtaining a more balanced fleet. ^ 
3.  Expansion Period III - 1985-1989: 
The third expansion period began in 1985 and is 
reflected in SIPRI by increases from 3.1 per cent in 1983 to 
3.2, 3.3, 3.7 and 3.9 per cent in 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987 
respectively. In the years from 1978 to 1982, defense 
expenditures plummeted to an average of 2.9 per cent before 
increasing in 1983 and 1984. Similarly, ACDA reports that 
defense expenditures were 3.42 per cent in 1985-86, and rose 
sharply in 1986-87 to 4.04 per cent. In 1987-88, it dropped 
to 3.59 per cent, which is still higher than the average of 
3.3 per cent experienced in the early 198 0's.33 
In terms of force structure, 1984 marked the beginning 
of the period characterized as "India's major military 
build-up."34 The Indian Navy increased its submarine force 
to include construction or acquisition of seven more 
submarines. The Navy also acquired more miscellaneous 
craft, increasing its total inventory to 95 miscellaneous 
ships by 1988. In 1986, India purchased its second medium 
sized aircraft carrier, along with squadrons of Sea Harrier 
aircraft to equip both carriers, and Tu-142 long range 
maritime patrol aircraft.35 And in 1987, India increased 
its amphibious fleet to 15 amphibious craft. By far the 
most powerful evidence of the naval expansion period is 
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India's lease agreement with the Soviet Union to acquire, on 
loan, a Soviet Charlie I nuclear attack submarine. By the 
end of the third expansion period in 1989, India's fleet 
consisted of sixteen submarines (including plans for 
constructing four more), seven destroyers, 24 frigates, six 
corvettes (with plans for constructing four more), 17 
amphibious vessels, 93 miscellaneous craft and 40 Coast 
Guard ships. This expansion period was by far, the greatest 
period of naval expansion for the Indian Navy. " 
B.  HYPOTHESIS NUMBER ONE:  THE THREAT HYPOTHESIS 
India's first mission objective was defending the coast 
and protecting the sea lines of communication. This 
initial phase of coastal defense originated from the 
perceived threats of Pakistan, China and any other outside 
power that could easily cut off a majority of India's trade 
and commerce routes which were conducted by the sea. The 
coastal defense also originated from the pre-Independence 
days when India was conquered by both the Portuguese and 
British forces by sea attacks and coastal invasions. 
When accounting for perceived threats, the coastal 
defense policy was the most practical policy in terms of 
both military capabilities and budgetary considerations. As 
India's history since independence has shown, only two 
countries, Pakistan and China have threatened India. And 
during the wars with both Pakistan and China, the majority 
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of the battles were fought on land as a result of border 
invasions and conflicts. The Navy has never been fully- 
utilized in any of these wars, with the exception of minor 
naval battles with Pakistan in the 1971 Indio-Pakistani War. 
In actuality, although the Navy has developed beyond Tellis' 
Model I, it has only been used as a Model I asset in most of 
its exercises. It is safe to observe that every navy must 
begin its naval development with the first mission of 
coastal defense, but the key factor is in what direction the 
naval development proceeds in order to become a true 
maritime power. 
India pursued the development of a more specialized 
navy in response to threats to its regional interests. 
Because of the presence of the USS Enterprise and her battle 
group in the Bay of Bengal at the end of the Sino-Indian 
War, and the ability of other countries to influence the 
Indian Ocean, India made a conscious effort to formulate its 
version of a maritime force. This force would proceed 
beyond the capabilities of mere coastal defense, but not be 
powerful enough to claim the status of a blue water Navy 
such as the U. S. Navy. India's Phase II naval development 
commenced with the purchase of its sole aircraft carrier, 
INS Vikrant. The presence of the USS Enterprise in the 
Indian Ocean region did persuade the Indians that they had 
been invaded and subjected to an insulating piece of 
military blackmail with nuclear overtones.   The incident 
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also helped solidify a consensus that there was a need to 
insulate the country against naval resurgence in both 
political and military terms. ' 
The shift in India's naval strategy corresponds to 
Tellis' Model II of naval development characterized by the 
ability to meet naval demands beyond that of mere coastal 
defense. India reached Model II in 1971 when Tellis states, 
that the Indian Navy moved beyond the first model of defense 
of territorial and contiguous waters when the Navy looked to 
achieve significant tri-dimensional capabilities of 
impressive numbers enabling the Indian Navy to configure and 
support two separate commands.^ 
According to one of the leading Indian naval planners 
and strategists, Rupak Chattopadhyay, the primary factors 
for pursuing the construction of such a Navy are economic in 
nature, not based on threat. He posits that "India is 
dependent on the sea for her economic prosperity."^ Due to 
the absence of the undersea pipelines, India's crude oil is 
brought in on tankers. Policy makers in New Delhi realized 
the need to protect India's shipping industry and defend 
Indian island territories, which are both economically and 
strategically important. In addition, "off India's western 
coast lies extensive oil fields which account for roughly 
two thirds of India's domestic oil production."40 However, 
I posit that the threat of countries such as the United 
States, China and Pakistan is the determining factor that 
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also relates to the defending of India's economic interests. 
Therefore it is first perceived threat that drives India's 
naval  development,  not  simply  economic  interests  as 
Chattopadhyay states. 
As mentioned previously,  the presence of the USS 
Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal solidified the perceived 
threat of a superpower confrontation that could possibly 
destroy  the  security  of  India's  shipping  and  island 
territories.    Indian  naval  planners  such  as  Dr.  K. 
Subrahmanyam summized: 
...the arrival of the American Task Force off the 
coast of India in 1971 has never been forgotten by 
Indian defence planners and subsequent defensive 
measures have been based around 'raising the cost 
of superpower intervention in the region.41 
Therefore, in order to solve India's perceived threat 
problems, India's maritime safety lies in maintaining a 
powerful, well balanced, specialized fleet. And due to 
Prime Minister Nehru's initial policy of non-alignment, and 
the country's insistence on not choosing an alliance since 
the policy of Nehru, "India has no superpower to guarantee 
her protection...India must be prepared to look after 
herself."42 
A portion of the threat that drove India to pursue a 
blue water Navy was India's shortcomings in relation to 
submarine warfare and cruise missile technology. Countries 
around India were purchasing more advanced technology, and 
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receiving much more assistance from the other powers, 
forcing India to look toward modernizing her fleet. While 
other countries were taking advantage of new technology, 
India continued to lag behind, and eventually stumbled into 
a more reactive form of naval policy and doctrine. 
According to Admiral Govil of the Indian Navy, "no Navy 
builds its infrastructure and force levels on the basis of 
current threats due to the very long lead time needed to 
build up sea power."43 Therefore, India must assess her 
future potential threats, of which he states they are 
Pakistan, China and Iran. With that in mind, India began to 
construct a blue water fleet. 
Also a perceived threat, which by India's naval policy 
makers makes it a valid threat, is the Chinese Navy. It is 
worth reiterating that India has only fought wars with two 
countries, Pakistan and China. The Chinese Navy is rapidly 
increasing its naval strength. In the recent period the 
naval wing of the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) is 
the fastest growing of the three services, which is the 
opposite situation in India. Through large frigates, 
destroyers, submarines and support ships the Chinese are 
adding to their blue water capability, and enhancing their 
power projection forces.44 
Although many critics claim that China is only building 
its Navy in conjunction with its economic progress as a 
means to ensure coastal defense, India must look toward any 
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Chinese naval buildup as a direct threat to India's maritime 
security because of China's proximity and India's 
vulnerability to a coastal attack. 
The PLAN also has a formidable amphibious force with a 
well trained naval infantry. In contrast, India's naval 
infantry is non-existent due to its inability to deploy and 
act independently from the Army infantry support. 
China also has an extensive defense cooperation program 
with Pakistan and a ring of client states around India to 
which China sells arms - Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Nepal, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. These client states 
could provide the Chinese with necessary refueling posts or 
port visits during a time of war. Myanmar is the main 
client of China that poses potential harm to India China has 
involved itself deeply in Myanmar 's affairs by China's 
financial assistance of $2 billion in the last two or three 
years, half of which has been in the form of military 
supplies.45 
With China's improved PLAN forces of land-based medium- 
range bombers and a fleet of over ninety attack submarines, 
it can potentially project its powerful arsenal into the 
Indian Ocean. Also of concern to India's naval planners are 
the PLAN'S aspirations to acquire a carrier force that 
"would gradually break away from the West Pacific Ocean and 
enter oceans around the world," and eventually "assume the 
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mantle of a major global sea power."46 This doctrine 
directly threatens any potential claim that India had as the 
regional sea power of influence in South Asia. 
Chinese maritime forces consist of modern principal 
combatants, particularly destroyers and frigates, armed with 
advanced western technology with a new surface-to-air 
missile launcher, improved electronic support and fire 
control systems. 
The closest posed naval threats to India are reports of 
Chinese assistance in the construction of naval facilities 
in Myanmar, and the modernization of existing naval 
facilities at Akyab and Great Coco Islands. These actions 
indicate to Indian naval planners that China may interject 
further into the region and threaten India's national 
maritime interests.47 
India and China are also disputing over the Line of 
Actual Control, which is the imaginary line separating the 
two countries in the northeast corner of India. Similarly, 
India and Pakistan are still at a stalemate concerning 
border disputes over the Kashmir region. Since neither one 
of these two conflicts looks to be resolved in the near 
future, it is fair for naval policy makers, who need to 
justify building a bigger fleet, to classify both Pakistan 
and China as legitimate and immediate threats to maritime 
security. Therefore, based on perceived threats, it is only 
logical that India would want to construct a blue water Navy 
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capable of containing both countries by Naval shore 
bombardment, able to project its sea power ashore, and 
equipped with the potential to successfully blockade 
both countries thus eliminating their sea lines of 
communication. In Tellis' words, the Indian Navy should, 
"undertake unhampered offensive sea control operations, and 
be credited with truly hemispheric projection 
capabilities."4^ 
C.  HYPOTHESIS NUMBER TWO:  THE ECONOMIC HYPOTHESIS 
Some explanatory power in understanding Indian naval 
development may exist with economic factors, therefore it 
is necessary to examine India's economic situation for the 
same three periods in order to measure the plausibility of 
an economic hypothesis. That is to say, did naval expansion 
occur as a direct result of economic growth? 
The first expansion period was from 1964-69. Prior to 
the first period, "during the 1950's and early 1960's, the 
growth of the Indian economy through emphasis on investment 
goods was substantial. The growth rate of 3.5 per cent per 
year seemed ineluctable."49 According to the proposed 
economic hypothesis, one would expect that the 1950's and 
early 1960's would therefore correlate to a naval expansion 
period. On the contrary, India's Navy showed relatively 
little development during this period.  If the hypothesis is 
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true, then in the period of 1964-69, there should be a 
relative increase in GDP growth.  But, 
In the mid 1960's, however, India's security- 
situation vis-a-vis China and Pakistan became 
somewhat tenuous. Foreign assistance to India 
concurrently leveled off. Additionally a drought 
in both 1966 and 1967 significantly affected 
agricultural  production  and  reduced  national 
GDP.50 
The second naval expansion period was from 1975-1977. 
According to the World Development Report (WDR) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), India's economy was 
relatively the same during the 1970's as it was during the 
1960's. The WDR lists India's annual percentage rates of 
GDP at 3.8, 3.6 and 3.6 per cent for the 1950's, 1960*s and 
1970's respectively. The IMF similarly lists their average 
percentage rates at 3.6, 4.0 and 3.3 per cents for those 
same years. Therefore, for the second naval expansion 
period, the average annual percentage rate of GDP was 
between 3.3 to 3.6 per cent as reported by both sources.51 
The third naval expansion period was from 1985-89. The 
economic factor hypothesis has more plausibility during this 
period. The WDR reports an increase in GDP growth in 1980- 
85 to 5.2 per cent, up from 3.6 per cent in the 1970's. The 
IMF shows a stronger increase from 3.3 per cent to 6.9 per 
cent during the same periods.  A third source, the World 
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Bank confirms the growth performance for the entire 1981- 
1990 period at 5.5 per cent. 2 
However, although there was some economic growth during 
the third expansion period, and none during the first two 
periods, Michael D. Ward, an economist and defense 
expenditure analyst comments: 
India's defense spending has not really grown much 
faster than GNP, but has fluctuated between 2 and 
3.5 per cent of GNP. Thus, it may well be that 
India has managed to remain below the constraints 
that would hamper economic growth. 3 
Therefore, it may be conversely true in India's case that 
India's economic growth, and in some cases lack of growth, 
has had no direct affect on India's defense spending.  In 
other words,  India's navy manages to acquire necessary 
equipment and material with its allotted share of GDP. 
D.   HYPOTHESIS NUMBER THREE:    THE  FOREIGN MILITARY AID 
HYPOTHESIS 
While threats are a necessary component in 
explaining Indian weapons acquisition and 
doctrinal changes, they do not provide sufficient 
explanation for it. 4 
In measuring the effects of India's receiving foreign 
military aid on the three naval expansion periods, it is 
first necessary to describe India's foreign policy. From 
partition, Jawaharlal Nehru established that India would 
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pursue a non-alignment policy.  Throughout the U.S.-Soviet 
Cold War, (which will be referred to as the Cold War) , all 
India's Prime Ministers followed Nehru's adherence to the 
non-alignment policy,  albeit manipulating it to fit the 
current situation.   India's non-alignment policy was not 
initially an aggressive approach to non-alignment, and it 
was not based on ideology.  Nehru pursued non-alignment as 
an international strategy, hoping to avoid Indian entrapment 
in great-power rivalries and to enable India to focus on 
internal development.  As a result, India's non-alignment 
policy was neither pro-active nor reactive.   India simply 
desired to withdraw from the constraints of a bi-polar world 
in order to construct more internal unity and solve domestic 
economic and political problems that existed as a result of 
partition. 
However,  India's passive approach to non-alignment 
turned to a more aggressive non-alignment posture with 
increases in threats from both Pakistan and China,  and 
India's realization of the benefits of being the "fulcrum 
point of South Asian politics."55 
Nehru believed that a policy of non-alignment 
would not only keep India out of the emerging 
East-West conflict, but also ensure its security 
from superpower intervention. But India's leaders 
also acknowledged that in order to remain non- 
aligned they would have to develop an indigenous 
military   capability   to   withstand   external 
pressures.5° 
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The  first  expansion  period  in  1964-69  was,  as 
previously stated, in response to external threats.   The 
1962 Sino-Indian War brought about a sea change in Indian 
defense planning because India now faced a two-front threat 
that could only be met by raising force levels. '  However, 
despite the new threat environment, the Indian Navy was 
forced to expand in response to the threat, but with minimal 
funding.   Therefore, what factor assisted in shaping the 
naval force structure in response to these external threats 
of Pakistan and China? As Gupta states: 
Its [the Indian Navy's] expansion in the 1960's 
was made possible by the opening up of the 
military relationship with the Soviet Union, which 
transferred submarines, frigates, and missile 
boats to the Navy. In fact, what eventually 
shaped the military expansion program then was the 
unavailability of resources and the military link 
with the Soviet Union. ° 
The military link was also expanded after 1965 war with 
Pakistan, providing weapons for all three branches of armed 
services. Another reason for acquiring Soviet weapons was 
the favorable terms offered by the Soviets. Weapons were 
paid for in Indian rupees rather than scarce hard currency, 
with a seven year grace period before payments began and a 
total repayment period of seventeen years, at an interest 
rate of only 2.5 per cent. 9 Therefore, in response to 
perceived threats from China and Pakistan in the early 
1960's,  India expanded its navy with direct,  solicited 
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assistance from the Soviet Union. By manipulating its 
foreign policy of non-alignment, India was able to make a 
military link with the Soviets without making any 
ideological or political shifts toward alignment. 
The second expansion period, 1975-77 was marked by an 
increase in submarines in 1975 and 1976, as previously 
stated. The Indian Navy acquired four Foxtrot Class 
submarines from the Soviets, doubling their submarine force. 
Although other submarines were available, India was only 
seeking the Soviet-made submarines. The reasons for India's 
purchases remained the same: favorable terms and 
inexpensive availability. In addition, the Indians were 
able to purchase these submarines and still maintain its 
position of non-alignment. 
The third expansion period, 1985-89, was highlighted by 
three different changes in naval force structure: 1) 
additional conventional submarines, 2) a second aircraft 
carrier, and 3) a Soviet nuclear attack submarine. The key 
for this increase in force structure was once again India's 
ability to remain non-aligned. In comparison, Pakistan was 
forced to purchase primarily western equipment, at a much 
higher cost than the Soviet equipment. The additional 
submarines that India purchased were West German Type 209 
submarines, which were commissioned in 1986. It was the 
first time India had acquired submarines from a country 
other than the Soviet Union.  In addition, India furthered 
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its non-alignment policy by purchasing a second aircraft 
carrier from Great Britain in 1986, and commissioning it in 
the Indian Navy in 1987. India now had conventional 
submarines from both West Germany and the Soviet Union, and 
a second aircraft carrier from the British. In keeping with 
it policy of non-alignment, India also purchased, on loan, a 
nuclear attack submarine from the Soviets in 1989. The 
lease of a nuclear submarine to the Indians marked the first 
time India was able to acquire a nuclear powered vessel. 
Throughout the three naval expansion periods, India was 
able to manipulate its foreign policy. And throughout the 
Cold War, India had built a formidable fleet, perhaps the 
strongest in the South Asian region. However, it is 
important to note that all of this military build-up 
occurred with India maintaining its claim of non-alignment. 
By manipulating its position with the Soviet Union, in 
response to the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, India was able 
to acquire weapons with no formal allegiance to any 
superpower. In contrast, Pakistan was forced support U.S. 
actions in the region and invest all its assets to U.S. 
interests. 
The ending of the Cold War was both beneficial and 
detrimental for India.  First of all, through non-alignment, 
India was able to claim that it neither lost nor gained 
through the demise of the Soviet Union.  Overall national 
strategy concepts remained important due to the proximity of 
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the Persian Gulf. India still had to defend its borders 
with China and Pakistan, and still had to maintain control 
over its EEZ. The detrimental effects of the Cold War 
ending were severely felt by the military as stated: 
India found its world turned further upside-down 
with the demise of the Cold War. Its $10 billion 
arms agreement with the USSR, which enabled it to 
repay loans at a concessionary interest rate of 
2.5 per cent in Indian rupees and in India 
products, was valid until 1997, but ended as the 
Soviet regime vanished. ° 
Perhaps India's non-alignment policy was beneficial in 
that during the transition period of the ending of the Cold 
War, India would have benefitted by attempting to lean more 
toward the United States. By constructing a navy based 
primarily on Soviet parts, the Indians placed itself, and in 
particular, its military in an obsolete state of readiness. 
India's Navy has suffered great losses with the end of the 
Cold War. 
The Indian Navy is currently in troubled waters. Ships 
purchased from the Soviets in the 1960's, 1970's and even 
the 1980's are already obsolete. The biggest problem is 
with purchasing spare parts for the existing fleet. After 
the Cold war ended, India is discovering that all of the 
fleet is ageing. Ships that were very useful when first 
purchased by the Soviets, are now not seaworthy. Although 
ships are on a periodic refit, and maintenance cycle, the 
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drydocking period last well beyond the planned departure 
date. Ships as well as ship repair facilities are finding 
it increasingly more difficult to obtain parts since the end 
of the Cold War.61 Where will the Indian Navy look for 
parts? Is the Indian Navy paying the price for India's 
policy of non-alignment, a policy that allowed the Indian 
fleet to be too dependent on Soviet parts and technology. 
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IV.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This chapter presents a summary of findings comparing 
each hypothesis for plausibility to explain what drove 
Indian naval expansion since 1947. In review, the three 
hypotheses are the threat hypothesis, the economic 
hypothesis and the foreign military aid hypothesis. The 
findings indicate that with perceived threat initially 
starting the naval expansion, foreign military aid became 
the primary factor that drove expansion in all three 
periods. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the economy 
only affected the third naval expansion period, but it had 
such a strong influence that India's economy must be 
considered in the future. 
Before evaluating the findings, a brief explanation of 
threat isnecessary. I divide the term threat into two 
different definitions similar to the definitions used by 
Walt. Both immediate and perceived threat are analyzed for 
to establishing that in India's case, both forms of threat 
contributed to all three of the naval expansion periods. 
Immediate threat, as defined by Walt, is threat based on a 
past conflict, war or invasion, or in other terms an action 
that was inflicted on one country by another. In India's 
case, wars with Pakistan would be in the immediate threat 
category. The perceptual threat is more intangible, and is 
defined as a threat perceived by one country of another 
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country where there is no direct action or conflict between 
the two. An example of this form of threat would be if a 
neighboring country, such as Pakistan or China, were 
building up its military inventory, and India perceived the 
military build-up as threatening to India's national 
security. The problem in defining perceived threat is in 
interpreting the intentions of a country that is building up 
its capabilities. It is important to understand that if one 
country can turn a perceived threat into a reason for 
builiding its own military inventory, then the perceived 
threat is also a valid threat. 
A.  THE FIRST NAVAL EXPANSION PERIOD: 1964-1969 
1.     The  Threat Hypothesis 
Throughout all three naval expansion periods there was 
both immediate and perceived. In the case of China as a 
threat driving Indian naval expansion, China can be labeled 
an objective threat initially, but more as a perceived 
threat during the second and third naval expansion periods. 
The first and only actual conflict between China and India 
occurred in the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 when China 
attacked India due to what China saw as an Indian intrusion 
into Chinese territory. India contested that the border 
with China was based on maps drawn by the British. The 
conflict arose because China refused to recognize that the 
border drawn by the British was legitimate.  Similar to the 
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Kashmir disputes, the Sino-Indian Border War was fought for 
both power and the desires of the countries involved to flex 
their muscles in support of territorial integrity. It has 
been officially stated that "the Sino-Indian Border War of 
1962 was India's greatest humiliation since independence."62 
The Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 was the key factor that 
drove the first naval expansion period. 
China is considered a threat for three reasons, with 
the first of these three reasons being the initial factor 
that not only drove the first naval expansion period, but 
also contributed to the other two reasons China is perceived 
as a threat: 1) China poses an immediate threat simply due 
to the 4000 kilometer China-India border, 2) China poses an 
indirect threat because of Beijing's military support for 
India's neighbors, especially Pakistan, and 3) China's 
capabilities threaten India's hegemony and ability to 
control the region.63 
Perhaps the most important threat to India is the 
ability of China to contest India's regional hegemony. As 
stated previously, the Sino-Indian Border War was the key 
factor in India's first naval expansion because it was an 
immediate threat, but it is in the perceptual sense that 
China has continued to threaten India in the second and 
third naval expansion periods. China's conventional power, 
military capabilities and its first explosion of an atomic 
bomb in 1964, combined with border tensions and differing 
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ideologies pose a perceptual threat to India. Some 
historians, including Asian expert, Professor Claude Buss, 
argue that China does not threaten India, especially in a 
maritime fashion. 4 However, because of China's military- 
capabilities, geography, and questionable intentions, India 
has historically considered China a threat, and continues to 
consider China a maritime threat as stated by the Indian 
naval doctrine papers. 5 
In the case of Pakistan, I argue that the definition of 
immediate threat was evident in the first two naval 
expansion periods, and perceived threat was evident since 
partition and continues to be a factor. Because Pakistan 
remains a constant threat to India in terms of border 
conflicts and India's grand strategy, it is correct to say 
that India will always be able to label Pakistan as an 
objective and perceptual threat, at least until the Kashmir 
dispute is resolved. 
India and Paksitan throughout their history of conflict 
have amassed fairly strong militaries simply to balance 
their own regional threats. The United States and the 
Soviet Union intervened in South Asia during the Cold War, 
upsetting the regional balance of power, which ultimately 
affected the immediate regional threat. As Walt defines, 
the further away geographically a country is from the actual 
struggle for balance of power, the stronger the effects are 
of the balance of threat theory.  Countries, such as India 
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and Pakistan, whose immediate security interests were not 
directly related to the global balance of power struggle 
were more concerned with the immediate regional threats to 
their own national security. 
Another indication of immedate threat that affected 
India's first naval expansion period was the Second Kashmir 
War which took place in 1965 between India and Pakistan. 
Although the Second Kashmir War did not formally start until 
August 5, 1965, tensions resulting from the First Kashmir 
War and unresolved issues between the two countries, assist 
in making the escalation prior to the 1965 war as a 
contributing factor in increasing India's military 
inventory. Immediately after the end of the Second Kashmir 
War, India's miltary expenditures increased, as described 
previously in chapter three when defining the first naval 
expansion period from 1964-1969. Combined with the effects 
of the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962, the Second Kashmir 
War helped to jumpstart India's decision to expand its naval 
forces. 
2.     The Economic Hypothesis 
The economic hypothesis predicts that during each naval 
expansion period, there would be a corresponding period of 
sustained economic growth. In measurable terms, hypothesis 
number two indicated that GDP growth would have a noticeable 
increase corresponding to a similar increase in defense 
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expenditures and naval acquisitions of each naval expansion 
period. 
During expansion period number one, 1964-1969, the data 
in chapter three revealed that GDP growth decreased to 3.6 
percent when compared to the GDP growth percentage of 3.8 
percent from 1950-1960. As noted in the data presented in 
chapter three, there was a severe droght in 1966 and 1967, 
indicating that India should not have been able to acquire 
more expensive naval weapons systems during this period. 
With agriculture as the strength to India's economy, it is 
sensible that a severe drought would damage agricultural 
production, and therefore reduce national GDP. As the data 
suggests, the drought did reduce national GDP during this 
time period. 
It is important to highlight that in contrast to the 
droughts of 1966 and 1967, India experienced strong economic 
development prior to the first naval expansion period during 
the 1950s and early 1960s. During the period prior to the 
first naval expansion period, since India's GDP growth rate 
was higher at 3.8 percent compared to 3.6 percent, it was 
expected by hypothesis number two that there would have been 
a corresponding naval expansion period during that time. 
Instead, the opposite results were discovered. As the 
economy grew, naval expansion decreased, and as the economy 
declined,  naval expansion increased.   Therefore,  it is 
52 
concluded that hypothesis number two does not explain the 
first naval expansion period. 
3.     The Foreign Military Aid Hypothesis 
The foreign military aid hypothesis proposes that as a 
country receives foreign military aid resulting from an 
alliance, its navy will increase quantitatively and 
qualitatively. In other words, a country's navy will 
benefit from an inexpensive availability of weapons due to 
foreign military aid provided by a country within one's 
alliance. States will act, or align with a stronger power 
in order to receive certain military benefits as a result of 
that alliance. 
The foreign military aid hypothesis applies perfectly 
to the first naval expansion period because of India's 
special agreement with the Soviet Union regarding arms 
purchases, which began in the early 1960s. As Amit Gupta 
states, it was the military link established with the 
Soviets that enabled India to increase all three portions of 
its military. Not only the Navy, but the Indian Army and 
Air Force expanded as a result of the Soviet military link. 
As Walt states, much of the military build-up could be in 
direct response to a neighboring threat, but the fact that 
the Soviets were willing to sell arms to India for rupees 
under a seventeen year payback plan supports the foreign aid 
hypothesis more.   In other words,  the presence of an 
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immediate or perceived threat can initially drive the desire 
to expand mililtary forces, but in India's case, the special 
military assistance provided by the Soviet Union was a key 
factor enabling India to actually purchase the military 
hardware. 
India needed to balance itself against threats from 
China and Pakistan. The Soviet Union understood the value 
of India as an ally in countering the U.S. influence over 
Pakistan in the region. Therefore, the threat hypothesis 
explains India's situation. But, how does India increase 
its military strength if the United States is supplying 
military aid to neighboring Pakistan. The foreign military 
aid hypothesis seems to fit India's situation because India 
could receive foreign military assistance simply as a bi- 
product of its informal alliance with the Soviet Union. 
B.  THE SECOND NAVAL EXPANSION PERIOD:  1975-1977 
1.     The  Threat Hypothesis 
Because of China's unspecified intentions, isolationism 
and historical mistrust between India and China, especially 
during the 1970s, India still maintained that China was a 
threat. Underlying the entire concept of China as a threat, 
once again were China's capabilities. With an enormous 
population to draw from, China's civil-military relations 
and China's unclear intentions, India perceived a stronger 
China that could possibly exert its influence in the Indian 
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Ocean region. In contrast to China's strengths, India has 
weaknesses in the previously mentioned areas. India's 
military is relatively small. India's military, in contrast 
to China has very little ability to influence India's 
economic policies nor control the future of the military. 
The Bangladesh War in December of 1971 could be viewed 
as an immediate threat for two reasons. The first reason is 
that it re-enforced the fact that Pakistan would constantly 
be a menacing and difficult problem simply because of 
geographical proximity and historical differences. 
Secondly, it was during this time that the USS Enterprise 
made its presence felt in the Bay of Bengal. This one 
incident by the United States has forever proven to the 
Indians that their mandala concept is extremely vulnerable 
by means of an invasion from the sea. Both actions combine 
to explain that the second naval expansion period from 1975- 
1977 could have been a result of increased perceived threats 
from Pakistan and the threat of a superpower from outside 
the region. In other words, the threat hypothesis has some 
validity in explaining the second naval expansion period 
just as it could explain the first naval expansion period. 
2.  The Economic Hypothesis 
The economic hypothesis suggests that during the second 
naval expansion period, from 1975-1977, there would be an 
increase in GDP growth that corresponded to the 1975-1977 
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time frame. Although there was differing data from the two 
sources used in chapter three, both sources reveal basically 
the same conclusion with respect to hypothesis number two. 
The World Development Report (WDR) indicated that the GDP 
growth remained the same during the second naval expansion 
period as it was during the first naval expansion period 
(3.6 per cent). Although GDP growth did not decrease, 
hypothesis number two required that there would be a 
noticeable increase in GDP growth. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), on the other 
hand, showed a noticeable difference in GDP growth between 
the period prior to the second naval expansion period and 
during the second naval expansion period. Instead of a 
significant increase from the first period to the next 
period, there was a sharp decrease in GDP growth from 4.0 
percent in the late 1960s and early 1970s to 3.3 percent in 
the late 1970s. Therefore, it would seem that hypothesis 
number two does not fully explain the second naval expansion 
period either. So far, it would seem that the Indian Navy 
successfully expanded its force structure regardless of the 
national economic situation. The Indian Navy was able to 
acquire more sophisticated, expensive weapons platforms with 
minimal funding from the entire national defense budget. 
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3.  The Foreign Military Aid Hypothesis 
The West recognized an informal alignment existed 
between the Soviet Union and India in terms of the 1971 
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation which was 
renewed for an additional twenty years in 1991. The terms 
of the treaty stipulated that neither state could execute 
undertakings inimical to the other's defense needs and 
called for joint consultations in the event of substantial 
military threat to either party. The result was a supplier- 
recipient arrangement in which seventy percent of New 
Dehli's arms imports came from the Soviet Union, lending 
plausibility to the foreign military assistance 
hypothesis.°6 
C.  THE THIRD NAVAL EXPANSION PERIOD:  1985-1989 
1.     The  Threat Hypothesis 
Pakistan continued to be a perceived threat in the 
1980s because there was still no clear resolution between 
India and Pakistan concerning the Kashmir dispute. That 
combined with the mistrust between the two countries, make 
it clear that the bitter Indian-Pakistani rivalry will exist 
at least for the next twenty years. 
In discussing China's civil-military relations, it is 
important to once again highlight the relative differences 
between China and India because the differences continued to 
affect India's perception of China as a threat in the 1980s. 
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China's military received a large percentage of government 
expenditures, and China's military was directly involved in 
China's modernization and industrialization of the 
economy. ' Another factor is China's economic potential and 
value to the United States in terms of possible markets. 
China's economy is the fastest growing economy in the world, 
creating a potential market including millions of consumers 
for U.S. businessmen and investors. 
Because of China's economic and military potential, it 
is conceivable that India continued to perceive China as a 
threat to India's mandala during the 1980s. In order to 
protect India's interests in controlling the region, India 
expanded its military forces accordingly. 
By reviewing all three of the naval expansion period, 
it could be interpreted that India has only acquired weapons 
systems that adequately balanced the capabilities of India's 
rivals. Although some may aruge that India drove Pakistan's 
military build-up, not vice versa, it is important to state 
that India did not increase its inventory exponentially 
compared to Pakistan and China. As immediate and perceptual 
threats increased from Pakistan and China threatened India 
with conflicts and naval build-ups, India countered by 
attempting to acquire more sophisticated weapons. Examples 
of this are India's acquisitions of conventional submarines 
and conventional aircraft carriers vice nuclear platforms 
during the  first  two  naval  expansion periods.    Also 
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supporting the threat hypothesis is India's continuing 
construction of smaller crafts, frigates and corvettes, 
implying coastal defense, instead of building battleships or 
cruisers similar to the U.S. Aegis class cruisers. 
India perhaps only purchased what India could afford, 
but in doing so, constructed a fleet that was only 
marginally superior to both Pakistan and in some terms China 
during the three naval expansion periods. Although it was 
threat, immediate and perceived, that initially drove 
India's naval expansion, it ws not enough to push India to 
develop a dominant superpower navy like that of the U.S., 
Soviets, or even the British. In re-enforcing what Amit 
Gupta stated, although perceived threat is a strong factor 
in driving Indian naval development, it is not the only 
factor. Gupta argues that the key factor was the Soviet 
military link.68 
2.     The Economic Hypothesis 
The economic hypothesis has much more strength during 
the third naval expansion period, which is from 1985-1989. 
As indicated by the data in chapter three, this was the only 
naval expansion period that corresponded directly to 
increases in GDP growth. In fact, all three economic 
sources, the IMF, World Bank, and WDR reported significant 
increases in GDP growth compared to the two decades prior to 
the early 1980s.   The IMF in particular showed the GDP 
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growth more than doubling during the third naval expansion 
period.°9 
As the economic hypothesis proposed, as GDP growth 
increases, the naval acquisitions will also increase. 
Expansion period number three proves that the economic 
hypothesis is valid in explaining the third expansion 
period, unlike the first two expansion periods. Adding to 
this hypothesis is the fact that during this period India 
showed sustained economic growth by maintaining GDP growth 
at a relatively constant high rate. Correspondingly, the 
third naval expansion period was the largest naval expansion 
period in terms of both defense expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP and number of specific, modern platforms purchased. 
Therefore, although the economic hypothesis does not apply 
to the first two naval expansion periods, it could be 
applied to the third naval expansion period as the key 
factor in driving naval acquisitions. 
3.     The Foreign Military Aid Hypothesis 
The first two naval expansion periods indicate that the 
Soviet Union directly affected Indian naval expansion 
because the increase in qualitative platforms that India 
purchased during these two periods were from the Soviets. 
The third naval expansion period, however consisted of 
German-built submarines as well as Soviet ships and the 
nuclear powered Charlie Class submarine.  But the ability of 
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India to purchase German submarines could also be seen as a 
result of the favorable terms between the Soviets and the 
Indians. In other words, since India was able to purchase 
modern platforms from the Soviets at a cheap price, and 
India's GDP was increasing, India was now open to purchase 
more expensive platforms from Germany. Having a growing 
sustained economy in this case contributed to India's 
purchasing power. 
For the third naval expansion period, the threat 
hypothesis could be the factor that initially drove the 
desire to increase Indian naval forces. The economic 
hypothesis, provided Indian defense planners with the money 
and purchasing power India needed to purchase modern, 
sophisticated weapons. The foreign military aid hypothes 
proved to be a constant driving factor that enabled the 
Indian Navy to expand for a third time. In summary, all 
three hypotheses have applicability during each of the 
different naval expansion periods, and it is a combination 
of these three factors or hypotheses that will enable India 
to expand a fourth time. 
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V. APPLICATIONS FOR A FOURTH NAVAL EXPANSION PERIOD 
Now that it has been established that all three factors 
have played a role in driving Indian naval expansion, this 
chapter examines the condition of these three factors in the 
1990s. By examining the factors in the first half of this 
decade, it will be easier to ascertain whether the Indian 
Navy will expand a fourth time, thus creating a response or 
competition with the Chinese Navy. This chapter examines 
the current level of immediate and perceived threat to India 
the condition of the Indian economy during the first half of 
the 1990s, and the most significant factor that will inhibit 
India's naval development, the absence of the Soviet 
military link. The condition of these factors will answer 
the question of this thesis, can the Indian Navy respond to 
a growing Chinese fleet? 
A.  THE THREAT HYPOTHESIS IN THE 1990s 
New Delhi considers Islamabad to be its most 
immediate threat, while Beijing constitutes its 
principal strategic threat. India's armed forces, 
among the most capable in the third world, have 
been configured (in terms of arms inventories and 
force deployments) to counter the perceived danger 
emanating from these states.70 
This section will examine the plausibility of Pakistan 
and China as a threat to India's grand strategy in the 1990s 
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and beyond. Although the Brasstacks Incident in 1986-1987 
could be considered an objective threat by India because 
both Indian and Pakistani forces were prepared to battle out 
what would be the fourth conflict between the two countries, 
there never really was an actual confrontation. Therefore, 
the mere threat of Pakistani forces being able to respond 
quickly to engage Indian forces on the Indo-Pakistani 
border, constitutes a valid perceptual threat for India. 
Contributing to the concept of Pakistan as a threat is still 
the historical conflict between the two countries as a 
result of the ongoing Kashmir dispute. Consequently, Indian 
defense planners will likely consider Pakistan as a threat 
for the forseeable future. 
Pakistan has increased its naval strength significantly 
from 1991-1993 while India's force levels have declined. 
Pakistan has the advantage with its Atlantique aircraft with 
Exocet missiles, and potentially with its future acquisition 
of Orion aircraft with Harpoon missiles from the United 
States. Also dangerous are Pakistan's submarine and 
clandestine forces. "Pakistan therefore poses the main 
threat to our maritime interests." ^ 
Pakistan also poses a serious threat because of its 
bloody confrontational past over the Kashmir border dispute. 
Part of Pakistan's overall military strategy consists of 
naval sea to shore bombardment of Delhi and Bombay via its 
major Navy base in Karachi.  The ability of Pakistan's Navy, 
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especially its submarine force, to effectively damage 
India's major cities poses the quickest and most obvious 
threat to India's Navy. 
The added ASW threat of Pakistan comes with the 
addition or future acquisition of the Agosta 90B submarine 
from France. The Agosta 90B submarine will include the 
fitting of the submarine-launched SM 39 Exocet missiles with 
better torpedo discharge and reloading system. The Agosta 
also has an integrated sonar system (active/passive bow 
search, passive ranging, passive intercept towed passive 
search and underwater telephone), all of which is a given 
aboard American made submarines. The most important feature 
of the Agosta 90B is the Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) 
system, which is a non-nuclear auxiliary system extending 
the submerged endurance of a submarine. The AIP system 
increases the period between required battery recharges, 
when a submarine is most vulnerable due to sound emanation 
and snorkel visibility.72 The added technological advantage 
in ASW has reassured the Indian naval planners that Pakistan 
was and remains a vital naval threat to India's maritime 
interests. 
China, on the other hand, is a little more difficult to 
comprehend as an objective threat to India because India and 
China have not had an actual conflict since the Sino-Indian 
Border War of 1962.  But for Indian defense planners, and 
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specifically naval planners, China remains a threat for at 
least four reasons. 
First of all, China has the third largest Navy in the 
world, and has formally announced its desire to purchase a 
catapult launching aircraft carrier to enhance its blue 
water capabilities as part of its Project 2000. The 
purchase of an aircraft carrier combined with the Chinese 
Navy's underway replenishment capabilities, and its cruise 
missile launching technology, give the Chinese Navy the 
ability to project power ashore from waters within India's 
mandala. Contrary to Asian specialists Professor Claude 
Buss, it is not totally inconceivable that China would 
strike India. China's current military capabilities and 
unclear intentions in the region are sufficient enough to 
list China as a major threat to Indian national security. 
Also contributing to China's naval strength is its 
indigenous ship building infrastructure. China's fleet 
currently consists of one ballistic missile submarine (with 
plans to build another one), six fleet and cruise missile 
submarines, 38 patrol submarines (with 40 more listed in 
reserve status), eighteen destroyers, 37 frigatesover 400 
fast attack crafts (with 280 more in reserve), 62 
minesweepers, 161 types of amphibious ships and landing 
craft, and other miscellaneous craft. Of this inventory of 
naval ships, almost all of the craft are built in China. 
India, on the other hand, during the 1980s became one of the 
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world's principal arms importers, and relies heavily on 
foreign bought modern naval platforms, and indigenously only 
constructs smaller surface combatants such as lightweight 
cruisers and destroyers. 
A second factor contributing to China as a threat is 
the China's presence in the Indian Ocean region with its 
access to the naval base in Myanmar and the Chinese Navy's 
ability to reach the Indian Ocean with their recent success 
at refueling a ship underway. Also contributing to China's 
unwanted influence in the region is China's selling of arms 
to India's neighboring countries especially Pakistan. By 
selling arms to India's neighbors, China has severely 
hampered India's comfortable control over India's smaller 
neighbors that India has historically enjoyed. In contrast, 
India has no forward bases outside of the Indian Ocean. 
Also India does not make deployments outside of its waters 
that would aid in establishing a foreign port of call 
routine similar to that of the United States. In other 
words, China has better relations with India's neighbors 
than India. 
A third reason China remains a threat to India is due 
to the ability of China's military to influence domestic 
policy decisions. The Chinese military controls a certain 
portion of the country's economy, and actually runs part of 
the industrial sector. Defense decisions are made by the 
military, and later supported by the government.  China has 
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a historical link between the military and the government. 
In India's case, there was no National Security Council 
until 1990. There is no equivalent to the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. De facto control of the armed forces 
rests with the prime minister and his cabinet, none of which 
are in the military. Therefore, the views of the prime 
minister on defense questions often prove decisive. 4 
A fourth element of the idea of China as a threat to 
India is China's recent economic success. With China listed 
as the fastest growing economy in the world, they are able 
to channel this new economic success directly into an 
already formidable Chinese military. As both economists 
Hewitt and Ward suggest with their economic theory, as a 
country's economy grows, its defense grows correspondingly. 
In the case of China their suggestion is correct. Chinese 
goverment officals have clearly stated that with their 
economic success, China will increase its military strength 
and become a major player in world affairs. India, still 
considered by some as a third world country, does not have 
an economy equal to that of China, and for the immediate 
future, will not achieve as powerful an economy as the 
Chinese. Therefore, the Indians will be forced to forge a 
military on the limited resources that the economy 
generates. 
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B.  THE ECONOMIC HYPOTHESIS IN THE 1990s 
It was observed by this study that India's economic 
situation did not affect Indian naval expansion during the 
first two expansion periods. But, because India's economy 
was a factor in the third naval expansion period, which was 
the largest expansion period of the three, it is important 
to address the Indian economy in the 1990s. The economy is 
also important because the naval platforms, especially the 
most modern and sophiscated platforms, are increasingly more 
expensive. Therefore, if India desires to purchase 
equipment like nuclear submarines, catapult launching 
aircraft carriers and AIP submarines, Indian naval planners 
will rely heavily on India's economic success in the present 
and future. 
India experienced periods of economic success during 
the 1980s, but during 1991 India's economy suffered greatly: 
The Indian economy has been marked by double digit 
inflation, two devaluations of the rupee, limited 
foreign exchange holdings (e.g., in April 1991 
reserves diminished to the value equivalent of two 
weeks' imports), and substantial budget and trade 
deficits.7^ 
The weakend economy initially led to decreases in defense 
expenditure and a reduced disbursement of monies in real 
terms. For example, the 1991-1992 defense budget was a six 
billion rupee increase in the defense budget, it translated 
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to  an  actual  decrease  of  six  per  cent  because  of 
inflation.76 
According to the IMF, India's GDP plummeted after the 
third naval expansion period when in 1991, it hit a low of 
0.9 per cent after being well above 5.5 per cent and even 9 
per cent previously from 1985-1990. In 1992, the economy 
somewhat responded with an increase in GDP to 4.0 percent.77 
In September 1991, then Indian Defense Minister Sharad 
Pawar declared that financial constraints had impaired the 
operational  readiness  of  India's  armed  forces.    He 
emphasized  that  the  defense  budget's  limited  foreign 
exchange component would not permit the import of necessary 
spares for weapons systems and equipment.  Pawar's concerns 
were likely aggravated by IMF fiscal guidlines precluding 
any significant redistribution of monetary resources to the 
defense services in the near to mid term. What this economic 
crisis tranlates to is the interruption of of several naval 
construction and acquisition programs.   Thus, the Indian 
government has deferred plans to build a 30,000 ton aircraft 
carrier based on a French design.  Indeed, no capital ships 
will likely join the Indian Navy's inventory until 1995. 
Budgetary   restrictions are hindering the Indian Navy's 
ability to enhance force projection capabilities.   The 
biggest problem posed by India's  inability to  sustain 
economic growth is that it questions India's ability to 
carry an economic burden of large offensive operations 
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executed at considerable distances from the subcontinent. 
India's economic woes may force the Indian Navy to remain a 
coastal navy vice a medium sized, power projection fleet. ° 
India responded to the 1991 crisis by correcting 
distortions in the economy and reducing pervasive state 
intervention. The intitial impetus came from a severe 
balance of payments crisis in 1990-1991. The crisis 
impelled the Indian authorities to adopt an adjustment 
program thant contained both immediate stabilization 
measures and ambitious structural reforms. Despite some 
policy deviations, the stabilization effort proved 
sufficient to restore external confidence and foreign 
exchange reserves. Although growth slowed intitially, the 
economy now appears to be responding vigorously to the 
reforms. Beginning in 1993, capital inflows surged , 
combining with the demand stimulus, bouyant export growth 
and a growing investment response to the reform program. 
All of this helped generate a broadly based economic 
recovery. GDP growth rebounded to 4.5 percent annually in 
1992 and 1993, and in 1994 reached 5.5 percent, just three 
years after the economic reforms were implemented. The 
projected GDP growth for 1995 was also 5.5 percent.79 
What this translates to is an overall increase in GDP 
growth similar to that of the third naval expansion period 
during the mid to late 1980s. Meanwhile, defense 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP have remained constant 
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at approximately 4.1 percent. If hypothesis number two is 
correct, then there should be a significant increase in 
naval acquisitions by the Indian Navy. However, there have 
been no significant qualitative increases in India's naval 
force structure. In fact, the Charlie I class nuclear 
submarine was returned to the Soviet Union because the lease 
expired. It could be argued that the Indian Navy has 
decreased in naval capability because of the ageing ships, 
including their two aircraft carriers and their eight Soviet 
Foxtrot submarines, all of which were used by Tellis, Gupta, 
and this author to characterize the expansion of the Indian 
Navy. 
If the third naval expansion period from 1984-1989 and 
the 1992-1995 period have similar characteristics of GDP 
growth increases, then what could be the difference that has 
not enabled the Indian Navy to expand a fourth time. Here 
is where the third hypothesis of foreign military aid has 
had its biggest consequences. 
C.  THE FOREIGN MILITARY AID HYPOTHESIS IN THE 1990s 
As previously stated, over seventy percent of India's 
naval inventory was Russian built. As a consequence of the 
demise of the Soviet Union, India is among the hardest hit 
of all countries in terms of foreign arms imported from the 
Soviet Union.  Not only were the hulls and weaponry Soviet 
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built, but the spare parts market was primarily supplied by 
the Soviet Union as well. 
To add to India's plight in 1991 was the demand by the 
former Soviet Union that some financial commitments be paid 
in hard currency. The Indians were also stricken with new 
terms regarding arms purchases including a withdrawal of the 
low interest, soft currency loans. During this period, the 
defense budget was already decreasing, so the Soviet 
pressure greatly reduced the attractiveness of Soviet 
weaponry. What also contributed to India's reduction in 
military growth was a confusion in Russia as to who 
controlled the fulfillment of contractual obligations and an 
overall decrease in production in Soviet factories because 
of a transition problem between the previously military run 
factories to civilian led factories.The interruption of arms 
shipments from the Soviet Union lessened the operational 
readiness of both the Indian Navy and Air Force because both 
forces are more dependent on the import of high technology 
items. 
However, despite these difficulties with the former 
Soviet Union, former Defense Minister Pawar declared in 
early 1992 that military ties with Russia and other members 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) will remain 
strong. He further stated that there will be no change in 
the Soviet-based technology used by the armed forces. 
Nevertheless, India has identified several East European 
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countries  possessing  large  inventories  of Warsaw Pact 
weapons as alternative arms suppliers. 
Now that the absence of a reliable weapons supplier has 
been identified, what options are available to the Indian 
Navy? In other words, perceived threat still exists from 
Pakistan and China that is sufficient to initiate a naval 
expansion period. The economy is beginning a strong 
comeback that could sustain a strong fourth naval expansion 
period. With the absence of the Soviet Union as a steady 
arms supplier, where can the Indians look to form relations 
that could produce favorable terms so that Indian can expand 
its naval forces once again? 
The remainder of this chapter discusses possible 
alternatives for the Indian Navy concerning alliances, 
normalization of relations and perhaps expanding the 
existing CIS arms market. 
Four options I will briefly explore are: 1) 
strengthening U.S.-Indian relations, 2) strengthening Sino- 
Indian relations, 3) maintaining a policy of non-alignment, 
or rebuilding the arms market with the former Soviet Union. 
These options will be examined in order to establish which 
option would more likely create a reliable weapons market 
similar to the one enjoyed by the Indians during the past 
forty-eight years with the Soviets. 
The Indian Navy needs to establish better relations 
with other countries in order to acquire better naval 
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weapons and ship platforms as a result of an ageing fleet 
consisting primarily of obsolete Russian spare parts. The 
number one naval power in the world is the United States, 
therefore, it would be beneficial for the Indian government 
to seek better relations with the United States and 
establish a naval arms import market. India has declared 
that they desire certain ship types from the United States, 
but because of India's non-alignment policy, and 
specifically because of the military link between India and 
Russia, equipment was not sold to India by the United 
States. Strengthening U.S.-Indian relations would benefit 
both the Indian Navy and the American Navy, if India were to 
develop into a reliable, and capable naval force that could 
support U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean and the Persian 
Gulf. 
The strengthening of Sino-Indian relations is also an 
option, albeit a difficult one. If India and China were to 
continue to normalize relations, the Indian Navy would 
definitely benefit because China is among the world's 
largest exporters of military equipment. Perhaps a 
normalization of relations could trigger weapons technology 
transfers between China and India that would help to 
modernize both their fleets. With China's advanced 
technology in building submarines, India could learn the 
necessary shipbuilding infrastructure that India so 
desperately needs.  China's military and specifically the 
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PLAN has more to offer India than India has to offer the 
PLAN, but a mutual defense organization or an agreement to 
share both the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea could 
prove to economically significant. 
The third option would be for India to maintain its 
policy of non-alignment. Although India still claims it 
does not want to build an interdependence economically and 
militarily with outside, western powers, the Indian military 
forces have suffered as a result. Maintaining a policy of 
non-alignment likely will damage the Indian Navy further 
because without the Soviet Union as a reliable market for 
arms imports, the Indian Navy has no external source. 
Arguably, some European countries have sold ships to India, 
but India cannot afford to spend the money to continue 
purchasing these expensive commodities. Perhaps by 
abandoning the non-alignment policy, the United States could 
create favorable terms for the Indian Navy similar to those 
created by the Russians in the 1960's. As has been shown in 
the past, maintaining the current foreign policy will only 
prolong India's naval struggles. 
Author Jed C. Snyder of the Institute for National 
Strategic Studies states that India's loss of its superpower 
benefactor and the demise of the non-aligned movement, has 
left India without its foreign policy anchors. India has 
thus found itself more dependent on the goodwill of the 
United States.   In addition,  New Delhi recognizes that 
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India's long-term power is dependent in large part upon 
economic growth and a closer relationship with the United 





The question of this thesis was to determine whether 
the Indian Navy could expand significantly in the next 
twenty years in response to a growing Chinese fleet. By 
examining what factors were most influential in the history 
of Indian naval expansion, a pattern was discovered and 
applied to the existing condition of the Indian Navy to 
answer this question. Basically, India's reaction to 
perceived threat was the initial factor in all three naval 
expansion periods, combined with the foreign military aid 
package provided by the Soviet Union. Although economic 
factors were• not influential in the first two expansion 
periods, economic factors were important in the third 
expansion period, which was the largest of the three periods 
in terms of defense expenditures and acquisitions. 
Therefore, it is concluded that a combination of response to 
perceived threat, some form of significant foreign military 
aid and a stable economy is necessary for India to 
experience a fourth naval expansion period similar to the 
magnitude of the first three periods. 
As Walt stated, India in fact responded according to 
the balance of threat theory. Throughout India's history, a 
perceived threat from Pakistan or China existed prior to a 
naval expansion period. The threat was either in the form 
of direct conflicts or wars, or perceived capabilities and 
unclear intentions.   By reviewing India's confrontational 
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history with Pakistan and China, adequate threat was 
consistently present to warrant an Indian military build-up. 
As the threat increased significantly, the Indian Navy 
expanded significantly in accordance with Walt's balance of 
threat theory. 
Hewitt's and Ward's economic theory that countries will 
expand their military capabilities as their economies grow 
was valid in India's case during one of the three expansion 
periods. Although the first two periods did not correlate 
to an economically successful period for the Indian economy, 
it is important to note that India still managed to increase 
its defense budget. Since the third expansion period was 
the largest period in terms of defense expenditures and 
acquisitions, it is concluded that economic factors are 
becoming more important as military weapons and ship 
platforms become more expensive. Therefore, economic 
factors will be an important factor for India to experience 
a fourth naval expansion period. 
Walt's foreign military aid theory is particularly 
enlightening in India's case. The favorable terms between 
the Soviets and the Indians were the most important factor 
in allowing India to expand its Navy. In compliance with 
the foreign military aid theory, the Soviets looked to 
increase their leverage over India to counter U.S. leverage 
over Pakistan. By the favorable terms with India, the 
Soviet Union felt India would be a potential ally in South 
80 
Asia. The Indians were smart to take advantage of the 
Soviet military link and consequently built a strong naval 
component, consisting primarily of Soviet-bought platforms 
and technology. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
significantly affected the capabilities of the Indian Navy 
which is now finding it difficult to locate spare parts and 
equipment to maintain its primarily Soviet-bought fleet. 
Nevertheless, the military aid package that the Soviets 
provided was perhaps the most important factor that helped 
drive Indian naval expansion. 
The possible resumption of the United States selling 
arms to Pakistan provides an immediate threat to India. The 
U.S. arms package consists of twenty-eight F-16s,  spare 
parts,  P3C Orion planes, missiles,  radars and anti-tank 
01 
weaponry.01    The  U.S.  arms  package  gives  Pakistan  a 
capability that could threaten India's surface ships, oil 
terminals, and off-shore installations. Indian policy 
makers evaluate the U.S. arms package as enough of a threat 
to help India build up its military. According to retired 
Major General Vinod Saighal of the Indian Army, the U.S. 
arms package is what the Indian government needs to justify 
a significant military expansion. However, Saighal further 
explains that the lack of military experience within India's 
leadership likely will impede any significant military 
increases. Saighal claims that regardless of India's 
economic situation, the ability of the government to turn 
the country's economic success into military expenditures is 
highly unlikely. Indian military leaders view the U.S. arms 
package is a direct threat to India's status in the region, 
but Indian government officials do not coonsider that threat 
as a priority that warrants significant increases in 
military expenditures. 
Perhaps it is better reflected by India's Minister of 
State of Defense, Mr. Mallikarjun, who claims that "the 
resumption of arms supplies to Pakistan by the United States 
will have serious repurcussions in the sub-continent." At 
an Army commander's conference in New Dehli in October 1995, 
Mallikarjun stated that the U.S. arms package "will have 
serious implications and will accelerate the Indo-Pakistani 
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arms race."     However,  the ability of translating the 
increase in threat into an increase in military expenditures 
is highly unlikely due to the lack of military experience 
previously noted by Saighal. 
In India's history, all three of the factors, perceived 
threat, economic success and foreign military aid, played a 
significant role in India's naval development. Those same 
factors likely will determine the Indian Navy's ability to 
expand a fourth time. No one factor can singlehandedly 
account for any naval expansion period. Although economic 
factors affected only one of three periods, the fact that 
weapons systems and ship types are becoming more expensive 
increases the importance of economic factors.  As a result, 
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it is concluded that a combination of the three factors must 
be present for the Indian Navy to expand. As one would 
suspect, perceived threat is still present, as India still 
claims that Pakistan and China have the capabilities to 
counter India's regional hegemony. In the first half of the 
1990s, India's economy is growing and it appears that India 
might sustain a level of economic growth conducive to 
expanding its military forces. The only factor not present 
in the 1990s is a foreign military package similar to the 
terms given by the Soviets. In fact, with the Soviets 
becoming an unreliable arms source, India's options have 
been narrowed significantly. The United States currently 
has frozen arms sales to both Pakistan and India, so India 
must look to Europe to purchase the latest surface and sub- 
surface technology. Another possible market would be with 
the Chinese, and since some normalization talks between 
China and India have taken place in the last two years, 
perhaps China is a possible future arms supplier for India. 
India's main problem regardless of which country 
becomes the principle arms supplier, is the fact that all 
these countries are demanding hard currency. India can no 
longer expect to pay rupees for military eguipment. 
Therefore, India's economic situation becomes even more 
important. In Ward's case studies of the East Asian NIC's, 
the economic success of these countries enabled them to 
purchase weapons in U.S. dollars.  India would also have to 
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pay in hard currency, amplifying the significance of 
economic stability contributing to a fourth naval expansion 
period. 
Another important point to address is India's 
indigenous ship building capability. Although India is 
producing some cruisers, destroyers and now submarines, the 
process is so slow that it does not equal the magnitude or 
criteria I used for a naval expansion period. The 
construction period in India could be anywhere from two to 
ten years for a few ships to be built much less the amount 
of ships that would equal a significant increase in naval 
capabilities. As analyzed by Sandy Gordon in India's Rise 
to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond, the Indian 
indigenous shipbuilding capability is weak. Of India's 
current fleet, Gordon agrees with Richard Sharpe, author of 
Jane's Fighting Ships, that the major combatants in India's 
inventory including aircraft carriers and the four Foxtrot 
Class submarines will be inactive by the year 2000. The 
projected numbers for the Indian fleet in the year 2000 are: 
one more aircraft carrier, two destroyers, two frigates, 
eight corvettes, one landing craft and two submarines. 
However, Gordon continues to say that of these projected 
ships, none of them are likely to be built by the year 2000. 
The only alternative to India is to purchase these 
platforms.85 
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India's economic success has become very important. 
Perceived threat is almost taken for granted due to a 
combination of India's aspirations to be the regional 
hegemon and a tradition of rivalry between India and 
Pakistan, and between India and China. The key factor will 
be India's ability to transform their economic success into 
purchasing power by seeking favorable military options from 
new markets in Europe and in the CIS. All three hypotheses 
will contribute to India expanding its navy for a fourth 
time. First of all, by understanding that China and 
Pakistan are still threats, Indian naval planners will lobby 
for an increase in naval force structure. Secondly, with 
continued economic success, India can pay for the latest 
ship types and modern weaponry with hard currency. Finally, 
by actively seeking favorable contract terms with other 
countries, India can purchase these new ship platforms at a 
reasonable price to the Indian government and the supplying 
countries. 
This thesis concludes that India will not experience a 
fourth naval expansion due to the lack of foreign military 
aid. In the 1990s, the only factor of the three tested in 
this thesis that is not present, is the foreign military aid 
package. As a result, the Indian Navy is in troubled 
waters, and will continue to struggle into the turn of the 
century. The basis for this argument is the fact that the 
strongest factor in the history of Indian naval development 
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was the favorable terms contracts that the Soviets shared 
with India. Without those terms, the Indian Navy would not 
have experienced the significant increases in naval force 
structure. An example of the effect of the Soviet military 
link is that seventy per cent of the Indian Navy consists of 
Soviet-built equipment. The Soviet military link began in 
the early 1960s just prior to the first naval expansion 
period and continued strong until the end of the third naval 
expansion period. When combined with perceived threat and 
economic success, the Soviet military link enabled India to 
purchase major ship platforms and technology pushing them 
into the category of a strong middle sized fleet. 
Without some form of military aid or favorable terms, 
the Indian Navy will not expand. If the Indian Navy is to 
increase in force size and force structure in the next 
twenty years, India must alter its foreign policy and 
establish better relations with the United States and China 
in order to capitalize on the best military technology that 
these two countries can offer. However, it is very likely 
that both countries will require India to make certain 
concessions resembling a stronger alliance and 
interdependence than perhaps India is willing to make. It 
seems that currently India does not have an answer to the 
problem of their military arms supplier dilemma. 
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